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Abstract
The Success of an Ethnic Political Party: A Case Study of Arab Political Parties in Israel

Israeli Arab political parties are observed to determine if these ethnic political parties are
successful in Israel. A brief explanation of four Israeli Arab political parties, Hadash,
Arab Democratic Party, Balad, and United Arab List, is given as well as a brief
description of Israeli history and the Israeli political system. The total performance as
well as individual party performances is compared to the percentage of Israeli Arabs in
Israeli society in order to determine that overall Israeli Arab political parties are not
successful, although there are nuances to the term of success that the parties achieve.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In 1948, war was waging around my grandparents’ home in the small coastal
town of Balad Al-Sheikh, Palestine as the Arab nations of Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and
Lebanon fought the newly founded state of Israel. My grandparents feared for their lives
as well as their son, my uncle Saleh, and when the Arab army told them that an Arab
victory was certain, they decided to flee for safety. They packed what was necessary and
left the home they had built, still furnished with all their belongings. They traveled to
their original hometown, the village of Jabba located outside of Jenin in the West Bank.
My grandparents were so certain that they would return to their home, but they never did
return. The Arab nations lost the war, Israel stood strong and victorious, and my
grandparents became refugees, two of the 780,000 Palestinian refugees that fled to safety
during the Naqba or “catastrophe” and currently still live along with their descendents in
the West Bank, Gaza, and other countries around the world.
If you skim the scholarly works on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, you would
assume that my grandparents’ story is the only story that exists following the Naqba. A
quick browse of a library’s section on Israel would reveal dozens of books concerning the
Palestinian refugees who were displaced outside of Israel with subjects such as peace
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, the lives of Palestinians living in the
West Bank, Gaza, and the surrounding Arab countries, and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO). However, not all of the Palestinians left their homes during the
Naqba. About 150,000 Palestinians remained in the country following the establishment
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of Israel in 1948, and they and their descendents still live within Israeli borders,
composing of twenty percent of the current Israeli population of 7,910,500. Whenever a
peace settlement is made between the Israeli government and the external Palestinian
refugees, these Palestinians, known in Israel as Israeli Arabs, will remain. Whatever
issues this community has with the Israeli public and government will remain once a
Palestinian state is created. Therefore, it is important to know what this community is and
how it lives in order to understand the challenges Israel will encounter once the state has
achieved peace with the external refugees.
One avenue to better understand the Israeli Arab community is by observing
political parties designed by their creators to serve the Israeli Arab community. In some
form or another, a political party has existed that caters to the Israeli Arab community
since the establishment of the modern state of Israel. A political party is designed to be an
organized front for a group of people in order for them to obtain material benefits or
achieve a political project. An ethnic political party, such as the Israeli Arab political
parties, is unique in that the group striving to achieve benefits or success in a political
project is an ethnic group or minority. For these ethnic political parties, success is not
only winning parliamentary seats but improving the standards of living for an ethnic
group. Thus, observations on the Israeli Arab political parties’ success or lack of success
and the reasons of it could reveal more information about how this ethnic minority lives
in Israel today. I will, therefore, be researching if these Israeli Arab political parties are
successful and why they are or are not successful.
The degree of overall success will be determined by a comparison of how close
the number of parliamentary seats these parties win in election to the percentage of Israeli
6

Arabs in the general population from electoral and census data obtained from the Israeli
government spanning the years between the first election of 1949 and the eighteenth
election of 2009. The design of a parliament such as Israel’s Knesset is intended to create
an accurate representation of a nation’s population. The idea is that an accurate
representation of a nation in the parliament will produce legislation that is democratic and
best serves the nation. Therefore, the closer the number of parliamentary seats is to the
Israeli Arab percentage of the population, the more successful the Israeli Arab political
parties are because they fulfilling the goals of the Knesset’s construction. However,
political scientist Yael Yishai has proposed that for Israeli politics, a political party’s
success is determined by elements beyond achieving an accurate representation of the
ethnicity in the parliament and winning parliamentary seats. To Yishai, success is
determined by a party’s survivability and their influence on the national public policy. A
political party does not need to obtain a large amount of parliamentary seats that is
proportionate to its constituents’ population if the party can exert a large amount of
influence in the Knesset.1 Due to this deduction, I will also consider success as the Israeli
Arab political parties’ ability to exist in the Knesset at all for a long period of time and
for its ability to exert any political influence. Electoral analyses and the general history
of Israel will be utilized to explain reasons for any increases or decreases in success these
parties achieve.
Beyond the success of the Israeli Arab political parties, I am hoping to gain a
better understanding of these ethnic political parties as well. In Israel, there is more than

1

Yael Yishai. “Israel’s Shas; Party Prosperity and Dubious Democracy.” In When Parties Prosper: The
Uses of Electoral Success, ed. Kay Lawson and Peter H. Markl, 231-247. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers), 231, 236-237.
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one Israeli Arab political party, and I will be researching four parties of this subset, most
of which emerged around the 1990s after forty years of Israeli statehood. Previous
research on the subject of ethnic political parties in general proposes that an ethnic
political party is formed after a major social event in a nation. I am curious to see if the
research on ethnic political parties’ origins explains why most of the Israeli Arab political
parties were created in the 1990s. If the research is true, what event sparked the formation
of these parties? If the research is not true, why did most of the parties form at this point
in history? Since there is more than one party in existence, are all the Israeli Arab
political parties part of a united movement or not?
I will be answering these questions along with the question of if the Israeli Arab
political parties are successful in the following thesis. To help answer the questions, I
have gathered research on the current literature on ethnic political parties and political
parties in general as well as a general history of Israeli history, politics, and Israeli Arab
political parties. I then will utilize this research to provide context to my analysis of the
Israeli Arab political parties’ performance in Israeli elections which should answer my
research questions. At the beginning of my research, I hypothesized the following:
H1: Israeli Arab political parties are unsuccessful in terms of representation or
power but are successful in terms of longevity.
H2: The political parties are a united movement.
H3: The reason for most of these parties’ creation is the Palestinian uprising
known as the First Intifada that occurred in the late 1980s.

8

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Any discussion of Israeli Arab political parties or their success pertains to the
overall academic discussion of political parties, particularly ethnic political parties, and
their success. Political scientists have been unable to unilaterally agree on the function of
political parties. Various schools of thought believe that a political party is for a different
societal reason. One of the earliest theories supported by some such as Max Weber,
Michel Offerle, and Daniel Gaxie is that a political party is a voluntary organization
created for the sole reason of attaining intellectual and material benefits for its members
by securing power for the party leaders. The political party is considered in economic
terms where the party is the enterprise, the party members are the laborers, and the
intellectual and material benefits are the products. These benefits are the party members’
reward and encourage them to remain in the party. For each member of the party, this
reward will be something different, for a party’s utility is different for each member. A
political party must create an organized system within itself with a differentiation of
resources between party leaders and party subordinates that provides labor specific for
the different tiers of the party in order for the party to survive. The composition of a party
is fluid. The party adapts to the political environment and to the capital members invest
into the political party.2
Daniel Louis Seiler theorized that political parties are not enterprises devised for
obtaining power but instead a mobilized support system created in order for a political
2

Jean Charlot. “Political Parties: Towards a New Theoretical Synthesis.” Political Studies 37 no. 3 (1989),
357-359.
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project to succeed. The political project is the party’s main goal and is created from social
conflicts fostered from institutionalized social cleavages in a society. According to Seiler,
society consists of four social cleavages: the owner-worker cleavage, the church-state
cleavage, the center-periphery cleavage, and the urban-rural cleavage. These cleavages
breed political parties unique to each cleavage such as bourgeois and worker political
parties forming from the owner-worker cleavage and centralist and regionalist political
parties forming from the center-periphery cleavage. The party is the vector where these
cleavages and the conflicts converge. Even though a party can change which cleavage it
lives on depending of changes in the political environment, the political party will always
be located on a social cleavage.3
.

Kay Lawson perceived political parties as an organization devised to be

democratic intermediaries between the citizenry and the government.4 These political
parties’ linkages between the citizenry and the government are strategic designs intended
to be the most effective way for the political parties to achieve their goals.5 According to
Lawson’s theory, political parties operate according to four types of linkage: directive
linkage, participatory linkage, policy-responsive linkage, and linkage by reward.
Directive linkage is unique to one-party, totalitarian regimes while the other three types
can occur in a democratic environment. Participatory linkage is characterized by balanced
interactions between the citizenry and the government, policy-responsive linkage is
characterized by government-instigated interactions that are a response to voter opinions,
3

Ibid. 353-354.
Peter H. Merkl. “Linkage or What Else? The Place of Linkage Theory in the Study of Political Parties.” In
Political Parties and Political Systems: The Concept of Linkage Revisited, ed. Andrea Rommele, David M.
Farrell, and Piero Ignazi, 3-16. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2005), 4,6.
5
Mildred A. Schwartz. “Linkage Processes in Party Networks.” In Political Parties and Political Systems:
The Concept of Linkage Revisited, ed. Andrea Rommele, David M. Farrell, and Piero Ignazi, (Westpoint:
Praeger Publishers, 2005), 37.
4
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and linkage by reward is characterized by clientelistic interactions where political parties
exchange votes for rewards. To survive, the political party must provide some form of
long lasting linkage between the government and the citizenry. The linkage provides the
political party with legitimacy and authority, and a failure to create a linkage will
inevitably result in the party’s demise.6
Political parties do not operate independently but are greatly influenced by their
political environment, particularly by the electoral system of the parties’ host country.
An electoral system is a set of rules that determine how an election is operated and how
the votes procured during the election are translated into political seats.7 Douglas Rae
highlighted the three major components of an electoral system as the size of the
constituency also known as the district magnitude, the electoral formula for translating
the votes into parliamentary seats, and the ballot structure. An electoral system can take
several forms and is usually classified by its electoral formula. The main classifications
are the proportional representation (PR) system, the single-member plurality (SMP)
system, single transferable vote (STV) system, and a majority system.8 These
components influence how a political party can operate and succeed. For example, the
district magnitude can alter the distortion and the proportionality of electoral results.
Gerrymandering and uneven population densities can allow one political party an
advantage over other parties, and the larger the district magnitude, the more proportional
the election results will be to the population. An electoral threshold, the required

6

Merkl. 7-8, 10.
David M. Farrell. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 3-4.
8
Ibid. 6.
7
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minimum of the percentage of the vote a party must obtain to win a parliamentary seat, in
the electoral formula restricts which political parties will participate in government.9
The premier scholar on the relationship between electoral systems and political
parties is Maurice Duverger. According to Duverger, electoral systems operate as an
accelerator and/or brake for political systems by exerting pressure.10 From this viewpoint,
he developed three laws for the relationship between electoral systems and political
parties. The first law states that a proportional representation system encourages multiple,
independent political parties to exist unless waves of popular emotion are present. The
second law is a majority system encourages multiple political parties that are flexible,
dependent, and stable to exist. Duverger’s third and most famous law states that a singlemember plurality system encourages only two, independent political parties to exist. His
third law is the most accepted of the three laws amongst political scientists. For this law,
Duverger argued that only two political parties will survive in the single-member
plurality system because the party is geared towards under-representation, the
phenomenon of a third political party to always obtain less parliamentary seats than the
votes it won. Voters will recognize this phenomenon and will vote for the two largest
parties instead of the other available parties in order to avoid wasting their vote. While
the law implies that its prediction will occur nationwide, in actuality, the law occurs in
individual elections. In the single-member plurality system, each individual constituency
operates as an individual election, and the results are amplified nationwide.11

9

Ibid. 12-14, 17.
Virgilio Afonso Da Silva. “Duverger’s Laws: Between Social and Institutional Determinism.” European
Journal of Political Research 45, no. 1 (2006), 37.
11
Ibid. 33-34.
10
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Unique to my research are the concepts of ethnic political parties and their
success. These concepts are dominated by two schools of thought founded by Kenchan
Chandra and Donna Lee Van Cott. According to Chandra, an ethnic party is a party that
promotes itself to voters as a champion for one or more ethnic groups and excludes other
ethnic groups by designating them as the outsiders. She considers an ethnic identity to be
an inherited nominal membership to categories such as race, language, caste, and
religion. An individual can have several identities but will choose to identity more
strongly to one of these identities.12 The exclusion occurs in the form of its mobilization
strategy towards only one type of voter or giving posts to a certain ethnic group.13
To Chandra, political parties, no matter if they are ethnic or multiethnic, are
successful if they are able to incorporate new elites from important ethnic groups into the
parties. These elites are individuals from ethnic groups who are better educated and better
financially from others in their ethnic groups. New elites will come from ethnic groups
that had just modernized and want to obtain a chance of holding political office.14 By
being able to incorporate new elites, a political party will be stable in the long run and
will be able to retain allegiance from its followers when it is not governing.15 The best
way for a political party to be able to incorporate new elites is by competitive rules for
positions in the party. These competitive rules are usually in the form of intraparty
elections governed by majority rule and open membership policies. The competitive rules
work because it provides incentives for old elites to recruit new elites in order to create

12

Kanchan Chandra. “Elite Incorporation in Multiethnic Societies.” Asian Survey 40, no. 5 (2000), 837838.
13
Kanchan Chandra. “The Transformation of Ethnic Politics in India: The Decline of Congress and the
Rise of Bahujan Samaj Party in Horshiarpur.” The Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 1 (2000), 40.
14
Chandra. “Elite Incorporation in Multiethnic Societies.”, 838-39.
15
Ibid, 837.
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coalitions of support for the elections. The rules also do not encourage defection because
if a party member loses his or her position, it is possible for him or her to gain the
position back.
Chandra illustrates this theory with the multiethnic party, the Indian National
Congress and the ethnic party, Bahujan Samaj in India. In the beginning, the dominant
Indian National Congress party used competitive rules and was thus able to incorporate
elites from the Scheduled Caste minority in the state of Karnataka. However, in 1972, the
party switched from competitive rules to centralized rules, a system where party positions
are allotted by single leader or selectorate. Therefore, the Indian National Congress party
was unable to incorporate Scheduled Castes in other states such as Utter Pradesh and
Punjab. In these states, the party was weakened by the ethnic party Bahujan Samaj which
represents Scheduled Castes. The Bahujan Samaj party was able to win supporters from
the Indian National Congress party in these states which eroded the Indian National
Congress party’s base.16
Chandra explains that the elites are created after an ethnic group modernizes.17
The Bahujan Samaj party was created from members of the Scheduled Caste minority
who became educated as a result of India’s affirmative action program.18 She explains
that the reason elites created the Bahujan Samaj party was because the Indian National
Congress party and the party system as a whole did not have meaningful representatives
from the Scheduled Castes and because these elites were facing social discrimination.19

16

Ibid. 845, 849.
Ibid, 840-843.
18
Chandra, “The Transformation of Ethnic Politics in India: The Decline of Congress and the Rise of
Bahujan Samaj Party in Horshiarpur.”, 28.
19
Ibid. 28, 35.
17
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These origins were reflected in its political campaigns. The Bahujan Samaj party placed
more of an emphasis on psychological oppression and humiliation in their political
message as a way to argue that voting would give Scheduled Castes self-respect.20
Donna Lee Van Cott argues that an ethnic party is “an organization authorized to
compete in elections, the majority of whose leaders and members identify themselves as
belonging to a nondominant ethnic group, and whose electoral platform includes among
its core demands programs of an ethnic or cultural nature.” (Van Cott 3). This definition
includes organizations that consider themselves political movements but operate in a
similar way to political parties and parties that contain members who are not of that
ethnic group or align with parties who are not of the same ethnic group.21 A successful
ethnic political party is a party that is able to compete well for power at the national level
and represent a broad geographical section of the country at the national level. These
parties usually are unified, organized, and experienced, having about fourteen years of
political experience. They are usually located in districts with about 25 percent of the
ethnic group they represent.22
From her research on indigenous political parties in Latin America, Van Cott
proposes that ethnic political parties are formed from social movements. She illustrates
this theory with 1990s Latin America. During the 1990s, Latin America was experiencing
radical constitutional reforms which involved indigenous social movements. Participation
in the reforms encouraged some of these social movements to form political parties in
order for them to have the reforms realized and to stop nonindigenous groups from
20

Ibid. 37-39.
Donna Lee Van Cott. From Movments to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Parties.
(New York: Cambrige University Press, 2005), 3
22
Ibid. 217-219.
21
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exploiting them. The reform process aided them by providing the new political parties
political access and ease at electoral mobilization.23
However, social movements are not the only element needed for ethnic political
parties to form and flourish. Van Cott describes the opportune environment for the birth
of ethnic political parties as an environment that is decentralized, has improved voting
access for its citizens, a weakening political left, a significant proportion of indigenous
people in a district, and the reservation of seats for indigenous groups.24 She places a
considerable amount of emphasis on the need for decentralization and a weakened
political left. Decentralization allows citizens to directly elect politicians at the local and
subnational level which gives political strength to the citizens.25 The weakening of the
political left allows ethnic political parties to appeal to the poor by class along with by
ethnicity.26 Members of the left are able to be incorporated into the ethnic parties and
provide experience and development to the parties.27
Ethnic political parties are not a phenomenon exclusive to Latin America, India,
or Israel, but a global phenomenon that has been expressed in various forms. One such
example of the concept is the current Maori Party in New Zealand. The Maori are the
indigenous people of New Zealand and have had some minor ethnic political parties that
existed in the early 1900s and the 1980s before the creation of the Maori Party.28 The
Maori have had a history of political participation in New Zealand politics since the 19th

23

Ibid. 10-11, 312.
Ibid, 215-16.
25
Ibid, 220.
26
Ibid, 9.
27
Ibid, 216.
28
Alexandra Xanthaki and Dominic O’Sullivan. “Indigenous Participation in Elective Bodies: The Maori in
New Zealand.” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 16 (2009).203.
24
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century due to the Maori Representation Act of 1867 that guaranteed four parliamentary
seats to the Maori in every parliament.29
Although unlike its predecessors, the Maori Party is operating under a mixed
member proportional system. In 1993, New Zealand voted to change its electoral system
from the previous single member plurality system to the mixed member proportional
system. According to the nation’s electoral laws, the ballot will be divided between a
constituency vote of individual candidates and a nationwide vote of individual political
parties. For the constituency vote, the candidate with the most votes will win the
parliamentary seat. For the nationwide political party vote, the parliamentary seats will be
dispersed according the Sainte-Lague allocation formula for all parties that receive five
percent or more of the vote. According to the Sainte-Lague allocation formula, each
political party’s total votes will be divided by numerical sequence of odd numbers. After
each division, the party with the highest quotient shall obtain a parliamentary seat until
all 120 seats are dispersed. The politicians who shall receive these parliamentary seats are
determined by a predetermined candidate list each political party sent to the Electoral
Commission. The seats will be given to the people from the first slot on the list down to
whatever number the allocated seats are. Voting is mandatory in New Zealand for every
person over the age of eighteen, and every eligible person must register with the Register
of Electors. According to New Zealand law, an eligible political party is one with 500
current financial members who are eligible voters, and each party must register with the
Register of Political Parties and pay a deposit of one thousand dollars before giving a
candidate list to the Electoral Commission.

29

Ibid. 190-191.
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Under this new electoral system, the Maori Representation Act of 1867 no longer
applies. The Maori have electoral districts separate from the general electoral districts
that are dependent on the size of the Maori electoral population. These districts are
determined by dividing the Maori electoral population by the quota for the general
electoral districts. A Maori can choose to register as an elector for these separate electoral
districts or for the general electoral districts and can periodically switch between the two
electoral districts during registering renewal. However, a Maori cannot vote in both
electoral districts at the same time.30
The Maori Party was formed in 2004 as a result of nationwide protests against
New Zealand’s Foreshore and Seabed Act. The Foreshore and Seabed Act gave the New
Zealand government jurisdiction over the country’s foreshore and seabed, land that was
previously a jurisdiction of Maori Land Courts. The Maori could make claims for
customary rights to the land, but the claims would have to be sent to New Zealand’s High
Court instead of the Maori Land Court. The law’s intention was for the government to
exploit the land’s natural resources for financial gain and was part of the administration’s
agenda to promote privatization and commercialism. Before and after the Foreshore and
Seabed Act was enacted in November 2004, the Maori nationwide protested against it
usually in the form of protest road marches known as hikoi. To the Maori, the law was
more than the exploitation of New Zealand natural resources. The Foreshore and Seabed
Act was part of a larger argument between the New Zealand government and the Maori
about the ownership of natural resources and its benefits and was a threat from the

30

New Zealand. 1993. Electoral Act of 1993.
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government against the Maori. The law’s enactment fostered disillusionment amongst the
Maori that the government could govern fairly.

31

Dr. Pita Sharples and Tariana Turia founded the Maori Party as a byproduct of the
protests and the subsequent debate to better protest the Foreshore and Seabed Act and to
promote Maori rights.32 The political party participated in the national parliamentary
elections the year after its creation and performed well winning four parliamentary seats.
In the following 2008 election, the Maori Party won five parliamentary seats.33 One
factor of this success was the electoral reforms from 1993 that created the mixed member
proportional system. Due to the change from the Maori Representation Act of 1867 to the
Maori electoral districts, the likelihood of a Maori candidate winning a parliamentary seat
has increased. This increased likelihood encourages Maori participation in parliamentary
elections as the Maori are more likely to vote when a Maori representative is available on
the ballot because they view a government that includes a significant amount of the
Maori as being more responsive to them.34
Another factor for the Maori Party’s success is their campaign strategy. The
Maori Party maneuvered in the Maori cultural paradigm and utilized methods of unifying
the Maori politically. The party presented the Foreshore and Seabed Act as a threat to the
Maori people and their self-determination and proposed that the best defense against this
threat was Maori politicization and working within the government. The Maori Party was

31

Maria Bargh. “Changing the Game Plan: the Foreshore and Seabed Act and Constitutional Change.”
Kotuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online 1 no. 1 (2006), 15-16, 19-20.
32
Michele Schoenberger-Orgad and Margalit Toledano. “Strategic Framing: Indigenous Culture, Identity,
and Politics.” Journal of Public Affairs 11 no. 4 (2011). 329.
33
Ibid. 332.
34
Alexandra Xanthaki and Dominic O’Sullivan. “Indigenous Participation in Elective Bodies: The Maoir in
New Zealand.” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 16 (2009). 182, 198.
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this defense.35 To further convince voters, the party highlighted tribal affiliations and the
Maori identity by campaigning at maraes, ceremonial Maori meeting grounds, and using
Maori cultural images in their visual campaign materials. By using these cultural
elements, the party was to consolidate a party identity that the Maori public could
identify and avoid the various disputes amongst the Maori population.36
In Slovakia, the current successful ethnic political party is the Most-Hid party.
The Most-Hid party is a party in a line of organizations that have represented the
Hungarian minority in Slovakia as a result of Czechoslovakia absorbing a Hungarian
portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I and Slovakia retaining this
piece of land when the nation was founded after the Cold War.37 During the Communist
regime of Czechoslovakia, the Hungarians did not have any ethnic political parties.
Instead, they organized via mass organizations. The first of these organizations was
Czechoslovak Hungarian Workers’ Cultural Association (CSEMADOK) which began to
advocate for minority rights after participating in the Prague Spring. In the 1970s, the
Czechoslovak Hungarian Minority Rights Committee (CSMKJB) appeared as political
opposition against communism and for a transition to democracy. The committee also
advocated for Hungarian minority rights.
After the fall of communism and the founding of Slovakia, three major Hungarian
ethnic political parties formed amongst the plethora of political parties: the Independent
Hungarian Initiative (MOS), the Coexistence movement, and the Hungarian ChristenDemocratic Movement (MKDH). These political parties were ideologically divided but
35

Schoenberger-Orgad and Toledano, 329. Bargh, 19.
Schoenberger-Orgad and Toledano, 330-331.
37
Sherrill Stroscheh. “Measuring Ethnic Party Success in Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine.” Problems of
Post-Communism 48 no. 4 (2001),61.
36
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merged together in 1998 as the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) due to increasing
electoral threshold exclusively for coalitions. Previously, the three parties were a
coalition to counter the previous increase of the general electoral threshold to five percent
of the vote. In 2009, the Most-Hid party broke from SMK due to SMK’s recent
controversial actions.38
Slovakia adopts a proportional representation electoral system that has voters with
one nationwide constituency. On the ballot, voters can choose four eligible political
parties in preferential order, and parties that succeed the five percent electoral threshold
will be subjected to the Hagenbach Bischoff method of allocating parliamentary seats.
Each party’s total number of votes is divided by a combination of the total number of
seats in parliament and the number one. The quotient is the number of parliamentary
seats that political party shall receive. The candidates for these seats are chosen in
numerical order from a predetermined list submitted to the Electoral Commission by the
political party before the election. Voting is voluntary and an eligible voter is a citizen
eighteen years or older.39
The Most-Hid party’s success was due to its ability to present itself as the lessradicalized Hungarian ethnic party. From 1998 to 2006, SMK had been a part of the
governing coalition in Slovakia and had adopted a moderate stance in order to appease
other parties in the coalition. While the party still pursued Hungarian minority rights, it
renounced its more extreme demands such as territorial autonomy and the abolition of the
Benes decree, a historical decree from World War II that had confiscated Hungarian land
38
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and took away Hungarians’ Czechoslovakian citizenship. However, when the party was
no longer in a governing coalition, SMK resumed its extremist demands. In 2009, the
party had planned to propose restitution to victims of the Benes decree but retreated due
to opposition. The controversy this action caused resulted in a break-off of the party that
became the Most-Hid party. The Most-Hid party presented itself as a multi-ethnic party
founded in cooperation between the Slovak and Hungarian communities. Whereas SMK
focused on controversial Hungarian issues in subsequent campaigns, the Most-Hid party
discussed issues beyond Hungarian minority issues. Thus, the party attracted more
moderate ethnic Hungarians and a small percentage of Slovaks to vote for it in the 2010
election. This strategy resulted in the Most-Hid party gaining parliamentary seats while
SMK failed to meet the electoral threshold.40
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Chapter 3: Case Study
3.1: The History of Israel
The modern state of Israel was founded on May 14, 1948 after gaining its
independence from a British mandate on the territory previously known as Palestine from
1920 to 1948. During the mandate era, the territory was populated by a majority native
Palestinian Arab population at 1,310,866 or 67% at 1946 and a smaller growing
population of European Jewish settlers who wished to form a Jewish homeland under the
ideals of the Jewish nationalist movement Zionism. Conflicts between the two
communities occurred sporadically in the 1920s and 1930s, but the conflict became
intercommunal war between the two sides when Great Britain announced in September
1947 that the nation would end the Palestinian mandate after a series of Jewish attacks
and sabotage against the British occupation after the end of World War II. The war and
the Holocaust revitalized the Zionist movement and encouraged Jewish settlers to form a
Jewish state as a safe haven for Jewish survivors of these events’ atrocities. Following
the establishment of the state of Israel, a regional war was added to the intercommunal
war between the Palestinians and Jews when Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan (Jordan
today), and Iraq invaded Israel on May 15, 1948. Throughout the both the intercommunal
war and the regional war, Palestinians living in the now state of Israel fled the violence
in the thousands to neighboring states in what is known as the Naqba or catastrophe,
although not all of the Arabs left the territory.41 The Arab population dropped from about
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two million people at the eve of fighting to about 150,000 people at the end of fighting in
December 1948. In other words, the population that became the Israeli Arabs were the ten
percent of Arabs who remained in the now state of Israel.42. This sudden shift in
population affected the Israeli Arab population long after the violence. The memory of
being the majority population still remains in the Israeli Arab communal memory and
inspires an aspiration to have majority status once more in the future.43
However, the Israeli Arabs were never able to achieve majority status. After the
fighting, the Israeli government placed areas of high Israeli Arab population under
military control from 1948 to 1966. The military controlled all aspects of Israeli Arab life
from freedom of speech to Israeli Arab institutions. Organizations that promoted Arab or
Palestinian nationalism were banned, agricultural production and the establishment of
new businesses were restricted, and Arab-owned land was expropriated.44 The reasoning
for the military control was mainly security. The Israeli government viewed the Israeli
Arab population as a possible threat to the nation’s security because the population could
possibly align with underground cells determined to fight the government or aid refugees
attempting to illegally re-enter the country. The government believed that the Israeli Arab
population did not fully accept the state of Israeli and wanted to change the government
to their benefit and the determent of the Jewish population. A military rule was the only
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way to deter any Israeli Arab backlash and successful solve any problems with the Israeli
Arab community.45
The Palestinian diaspora and the military regime politically weakened the Israeli
Arabs. The Arab political leadership and organizations that existed during the Mandate
period were destroyed, and any attempt to politically organize afterwards failed due to the
military regime’s restrictions.46 However, an Israeli Arab political awakening began to
occur during the 1970s after the Six Day War of 1967 occurred.47
The Six Day War was fought in June 1967 between Israel, Egypt, Syria, and
Jordan. In the previous month, Egypt had acquired faulty intelligence from its ally the
Soviet Union that Israel was preparing to attack Syria, Egypt’s ally, as retribution against
Syria’s aid to Palestinian guerillas. To bolster Egypt’s image as the leader of the Arab
world, Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser deployed troops in the Sinai Peninsula
near the Israeli border and placed a blockade on the Straits of Tiran, an important Israeli
shipping passage even though he was militarily weak at the time due to a military
intervention in Yemen. Soon after, Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt as Nasser’s
action gained regional popularity. The Israeli government viewed this alliance between
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and Egypt’s actions as a threat to Israel’s security and launched
a pre-emptive attack on the three nations on June 5. The Arab nations were unprepared
for the attack, and Israel won the war in six days.
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The quick and remarkable victory against three nations gave Israel a sense of
invincibility and a image of military superiority in the Middle East. The country was no
longer afraid of possible attacks from its Arab neighbors. Along with the confidence
boost, Israel gained a significant amount of territory with the addition of East Jerusalem,
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights.48 While the
Palestinian population in these territories are not considered Israeli Arabs or have the
same rights of their Israeli Arab counterparts, the addition of the territories influenced the
Israeli Arabs. The two communities were now able to connect to family members
separated from since the Naqba , engage in daily contact amongst themselves and
develop economic, cultural and educational ties. These interactions fostered a nationalist
awareness amongst the Israeli Arabs that resulted in a political awakening that was now
possible due to the end of the military regime. This new awakening campaigned for
improved conditions for the Israeli Arab population and for the Palestinians living in the
territories.49
Another major development of the 1970s was the Yom Kippur war and its
aftermath. The Yom Kippur War was a 1973 Israeli victory against an Egyptian and
Syrian surprise attack that unnerved the general Israeli population. In the year previous to
the war, current Egyptian president Anwar Sadat attempted to instigate a peace deal
between Egypt and Israel in order to receive much-needed economic benefits from Israeli
allies. However, Sadat was unsuccessful because Israel was still in a position of
confidence and power from the Six Day War. To better convince Israel to engage in a
peace deal, Egypt along with its ally Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October
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6, 1973. Egypt was able to successfully overtake the Israeli side of the Suez Canal but did
not proceed to march further into Israeli territory and was later surrounded by Israeli
troops. The two sides agreed to a cease-fire on October 20, 1973. For Sadat, the war and
Egypt’s crossing of the Suez Canal was a political victory. Israel became more willing to
commence a peace process with Egypt.50 However, for Israel, the surprised attack
destroyed Israel’s image of superiority.
This blow to Israel’s confidence helped end the thirty reign of the Labour party in
the 1977 elections with its loss to the Likud party. Until that election, the Labour party
led every government since the nation’s establishment.51 The end of Labour dominance
destabilized the political environment and increased the importance of Israeli Arabs in
national elections. Now that the final results were uncertain, the two major political
parties, Labour and Likud, needed every vote possible for political victory including the
Israeli Arabs. The Israeli Arabs had more political power and options after Labour’s
defeat.52
The desire to form peace talks caused by the Yom Kippur War also led to the
creation of the Camp David Accords. Diplomatic initiatives to form the peace talks did
not occur directly after the war’s conclusion but instead after Anwar Sadat’s historic visit
to Jerusalem on November 20, 1977 and his speech before the Israeli parliament, the
Knesset. He was the first Arab leader to do so at that time. Peace talks began soon after
between the nations with the United States as the third party and focused on bilateral
Israeli-Egyptian relations as well as comprehensive plan for peace in the Middle East. In
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September 1978, the two nations met at Camp David in the United States for an intensive
thirteen day negotiation that formed the Camp David Accords. The Camp David Accords
were composed of an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the first between Israel and an Arab
nation, and “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East”, a proposed plan for peace in
the region that would create an autonomous Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.
The treaty was signed on March 26, 1979, but the framework failed soon after. 53
Domestic relations between Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, and the Palestinian
external refugees located in the territories reached a nadir in 1987 with the First Intifada.
What began as a minor road accident in the Gaza strip between the Israeli military and
local Palestinians that resulted in the deaths of four Palestinians quickly became a series
of protests against the Israeli occupation in the Palestinian territories that included
peaceful means like mass demonstrations and strikes as well as violent means such as
stabbings and shootings in the Palestinian territories against Israeli occupation from 1987
to 1990.54
The sudden appearance of the First Intifada surprised the Israeli public. The First
Intifada was the first of kind of protest of this magnitude since the state was founded in
1948 and was unlike previous protest movements for the First Intifada had elements such
as women and children being a significant amount of the casualties and the blocking of
Israeli roads.55 While the majority of demonstrators were Arabs who lived in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, the events of the Intifada affected the relationship of the Israeli
Arabs and the Israeli Jews. Expressions of Palestinian nationalism that ranged from
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publically waving Palestinian flags to actively participating in the movement increased
amongst the Israeli Arabs, but distrust of the community from Israeli Jews also
increased.56 To some Israelis, there was no difference between the Palestinian territories
and Israel Proper and between the Palestinian Arabs who lived in the territories and the
Israeli Arabs who lived in Israel Proper. The First Intifada was perceived as an event
occurring all over the country, and no Israeli Jew was safe from these attacks specifically
because of their Israeli Arab neighbors.57 Once again, society perceived the Israeli Arabs
as a security threat to the existence of Israel, and both the government and the Israeli
media threatened the community to not participate in the First Intifada and conform to
Israeli society.58
Following the First Intifada, the Israeli government and the Palestinians
strengthened their resolve to achieve peace between the two communities. In October
1991, Israel and Palestinian representatives along with Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan
gathered at the Madrid Conference, a jointly Soviet Union-the United States sponsored
conference designed to form a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The
conference and subsequent meetings failed due to a disagreement amongst the two sides
concerning Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories. However in 1993, Israel and
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), a Palestinian resistance organization
headed by Yasser Arafat, signed the Oslo Accords after a series of clandestine meetings
in Oslo, Norway.

56

Ibid. 188, 192-195.
Ibid. 196-197.
58
Ibid. 199-204.
57

29

The Oslo Accords consisted of two agreements. The first agreement stated that
the state of Israel recognizes the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people and the PLO recognizes Israel’s right to exist and renounces the use of terror and
violence. The second agreement was the Declaration of Principles on Palestinian SelfRule also known as Oslo I. Oslo I outlined a five year plan for an interim Palestinian
autonomous government in the Palestinian territories although Israel would still maintain
sovereignty over the area. This autonomous government would become the current
Palestinian Authority. The Oslo II agreement that was signed in 1995 provided the
details to how power was to be given to this government and where it would rule. Oslo I
was meant to lead to a final peace agreement even though the agreement neither
explicitly mentioned the creation of a Palestinian state nor provided a solution to
continuous issues such as the Palestinian refugees or the Israeli settlements. Despite these
flaws, the Oslo Accords were still considered an historic step forward to peace between
the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Criticism against the Oslo Accords came from both sides, in particular the
religious factions. Both the Orthodox Jews and Islamic fundamentalists, the militant
Palestinian resistance movement Hamas in particular, viewed the accords as a violation
of their religious creeds. For the Orthodox Jews, giving any land to the Palestinians was
against God’s covenant of the land promised to the Jewish people. For the Islamic
fundamentalists, recognizing the existence of Israel prevented them from returning the
land to Islamic rule. Both sides responded with violent protests. Hamas began a series of
suicide bombings in Israel in 1994, and in November 1995, a Jewish religious student
assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister who signed the Oslo
30

Accords. The assassination suspended future negotiations, but the violent acts further
sowed distrust between the two sides and disenchanted both communities about the
possibility of success.59
A Second Intifada flared as a result of the disenchantment about the likelihood of
peace between Israel and the external Palestinian refugees. In July 2000, Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian Authority’s president, met in the
United States for a two week conference for peace negotiations in what was known as
Camp David II. The conference failed because neither side could reach a settlement on
the controversial issues they had been avoiding. Soon after the conference’s failure,
Israeli politician and former army general Ariel Sharon visited the contentious area the
Temple Mont, a holy site for both Jews and Muslims, in September of that year. Viewing
the visit as an affront to Islam, the Palestinians protested in mass demonstrations that
signaled the beginning of the Second Intifada. The Second Intifada was marked by
militarization of both sides. Whereas before the Palestinians attempted mostly peaceful
protests where the most violent acts were throwing stones, the Second Intifada consisted
of suicide bombings and loosely organized militant groups. The Israeli response to the
protests was also more deadly in the Second Intifada with the Israeli military using the
likes of tanks and fighter jets against the protesters. Once again, the Israeli Jews felt
threatened and vulnerable and grew to distrust all Palestinians including the Israeli
Arabs.60
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3.2: The Israeli Political System
The Israeli electoral system is a proportional representation system where citizens
vote nationwide constituency for political parties to serve in the Israeli parliament, the
Knesset. A political party wins parliamentary seats as long as it wins currently two
percent or more of the national vote, one of the lowest electoral thresholds in the world
which promotes small, niche political parties to be formed and fractionalization in the
party system. Seats are currently distributed according to the Bader-Offer Method, more
commonly known as the D’Hondt method. According to the Bader-Offer Method, each
valid party’s total votes are divided by a general indicator that is calculated by dividing
the total valid votes of the election by 120, the total number of seats in the Knesset. The
quotient is the number of parliamentary seats each party obtains. Between 1949 and
1973, the seats were determined by the Hagenbach-Bischoff method also known as the
Hare method, a process of giving seats to the parties with the largest excess votes after
the party surpasses a quota. Candidates for these seats are chosen numerically from a list
previously made by the political party and sent to the Electoral Commission. Political
parties are allowed to practice apparentment, the practice of joining for an alliance and
link their lists of candidates. Any surplus votes from this alliance are dividing the each
party’s total valid votes by the alliance’s number of seats and the number one. The party
with the highest quotient will receive the surplus seat.61
Political parties cannot participate in the election if the party incites racism, does
not acknowledge the existence of the state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, or
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does not acknowledge the democratic character of Israel. Such suspensions can only
occur after either the attorney-general, the chairman of the Central Committee, or one
fourth of the Election Committee appeals to the Supreme Court for the suspension.
Citizens are ineligible to be candidates for Knesset seats if they are either the president of
the state, one of the Chief Rabbis, a judge currently in office in the legal courts or the
religious courts, the state comptroller, the chief of the General Staff of the Defense Army,
a religious minister, or a senior state employee or army officer whose functions are
determined by the law.62
As previously stated in the literature review, the design of an electoral system can
affect the party system of a nation. Israel’s proportional representation system and large
district magnitude promote a theoretically more proportional election result and
encourages more political parties to be in the Knesset. The average voter has no
involvement in the individual candidates who will possibly represent them in the Knesset
due to the candidate lists being made before the election by the political party’s
headquarters and its members. This situation along with the large district magnitude does
not promote much candidate-constituency interactions on the individual level. An
electoral threshold is generally created to reduce the number of small political parties that
are organized around niches such as ethnicity. However, Israel’s electoral threshold is so
low that these parties still flourish. 63 The threshold has risen over the course of the
nation’s existence but is still unable to counteract this phenomenon.64
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The only major electoral reform in Israeli history has been the separate election
for prime minister between 1996 and 2001. The reform was an attempt to stifle the
ongoing party fractionalization in the Israeli political system. The government believed
that there were too many small, niche political parties for the political system to operate
effectively. Before and after the reform, the president of Israel appoints a politician after
the election to form a governing coalition. This person is usually the leader of the party
that won the most seats in the election and will become the prime minister.65 According
to the electoral reform, in the 1996, 1999, and 2001 elections, the position of prime
minister was chosen by a nationwide direct election performed at the same time of
parliamentary elections. Much like how New Zealand’s electoral reform increased voter
participation and how the fall of Communism in Slovakia prompted the creation of
several political parties, the reform resulted in various new political parties being formed
in this time period. In the 1999 election, an unprecedented thirty-three political parties
participated in the election, and of those parties, fifteen won seats in the Knesset.66
3.2.1:The Two Major Israeli Political Parties
In Israel, the political system is dominated by two political parties, the Labour
Party representing the political left and the Likud Party representing the political right.
Even though these parties are the dominating forces in Israel, the two parties have begun
to lose political strength since the 1990s.67
The Labour Party officially formed in 1968 following the merging of the Mapai
Party, the Ahdut Havoda Party, and the Rafi Party. Before the merge, Mapai dominated
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Israeli politics, establishing every governing coalition since the establishment of the state.
Mapai was formed in 1930 in the Palestinian mandate on the basis of Zionism and
socialism. Ahdut Havoda and Rafi were parties that broke away from Mapai in 1942 and
1965 respectively. Following the merge, Labour continued the political left’s dominance
of Israeli politics until the 1977 elections when the party lost to the Likud Party. 68 This
loss was a result of the discovery of corruption within the political party, an inadequate
party structure coupled with a leadership vacuum, and the national shock from the
surprise attack starting the October War which occurred during Labour’s dominance.69
Since the 1977 elections, Labour has only been able to win the 1984, 1992, and 1999
elections, although following the 1984 election, Labour ruled the government in a
coalition with Likud.70
Following the First Intifada, the Labour Party began to advocate peace
negotiations with the Palestinians. In 1996, the party agreed to no longer oppose a
Palestinian state or an end to Israeli control of the Golan Heights. A Labour government
formed the Oslo Accords as well as other peace attempts. Following the Second Intifada,
the party called for a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza.71
The Likud Party was formed in 1973 from a merge of political parties that
consisted mainly of the Herut Party and the Liberal Party but also consisted of smaller
political parties such as the National List.72 The Herut Party was founded in 1925 with its
ideals founded on the Revisionist form of Zionism. Revisiosnism formed in 1925, its
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followers believed that the ruling Zionist Organization, from which Mapai formed,
needed to be revised and that Jews needed to adopt militancy to achieve their nationalistic
goals.73 Herut followed this idealogy and also believed that Israel should have claim over
all the territory under the former British mandate. To Heurt’s followers, this territory
should not be divided in any manner. Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza following
the 1967 war were therefore encouraged by the Herut Party. The Liberal Party founded
its ideology from the General Zionists, an organization that supported a limited
government and free enterprise. Between these two political parties, Herut was the major
force inside Likud while the Liberal Party experienced a weaker role.74 Likud itself
supports a mixing of these two parties’ ideals. It supports a free market economy along
with a preservation of Jewish culture and territory. Likud established settlements in the
West Bank and introduced the law that stated a united Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.75 The
party also opposed the Oslo Accords and a Palestinian state. The party first won an Israeli
election in 1977 and has been the main political party in power since then.76
3.3: Israeli Arab Political Parties
The Palestinian community’s political foundation that existed during the Mandate
period dissipated after the Naqba due to the exit of political leaders and the exit of
780,000 Palestinians. The Israeli military rule placed over the Israeli Arab community
from 1948 to 1966 restricted any independent Israeli Arab political parties from forming
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although attempts were made.77 Most notable of these failed attempts is the Al-Ard
movement of 1961-1964, a movement whose ideology can be inferred by the translation
of its name. In Arabic, al-ard means “the earth or the ground” which signifies that this
movement’s focus was territorially based. In its essence, the Al-Ard movement was
nationalistic. In 1964, when the movement attempted to register as a political party, the
Haifa district commissioner refused to register the organization on the grounds that the
movement’s goal was to subversively influence the public with propaganda that
supported the destruction of the state of Israel. During the appeals case, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Al-Ard movement was an illegal organization.78 However, Israeli
Arab political parties that were supported by Zionist parties were able to survive during
the military regime. Zionist parties, in particular the modern Labour party’s predecessor
Mapai, would back political parties led by Israeli Arab clan leaders that would operate as
their satellite parties as extensions of clan politics that governed the Israeli Arab
community. These satellite parties would have the same policies and objectives as their
Zionist counterparts but were composed of Arab members instead of Jewish members
and operate in the Arab sectors that the Zionist parties would avoid. The satellite parties
allowed the Zionist parties to have control over an Israeli Arab constituent without
opening the party to the Israeli Arab community. All of the satellite parties that won
Knesset seats, such as the Democratic List of the Palestinian Minority and Progress and
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Development, were the ones supported by Mapai, and this brand of party exited the
Israeli political stage by 1981.79
Since the end of the satellite parties, four ethnic political parties have emerged
that represent the Israeli Arab community: Hadash, Arab Democratic Party, Balad, and
the United Arab List. While other Israeli Arab political parties have been created, these
four parties have won Knesset seats, and three of the four are currently members of the
Knesset. None of these parties are alike as well. Each of these political parties represents
a different political ideology within the Israeli Arab community. Due to their political
strength and diversity, I will be focusing on Hadash, Arab Democratic Party, Balad, and
the United Arab List in my research.
3.3.1: Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash)
The roots of the communist party Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (also
known as Hadash,) roots exist from the foundation of the state of Israel. Maki, the Israeli
Communist Party, incorporated Arab members into its organization since its inception in
1948. In the 1960s, political infighting with the Jewish and Arab factions within Maki
resulted in the formation of the Arab faction’s New Communist List (Rakeh) which
created Hadash in 1977 as an umbrella organization for both Rakeh and its allies such as
the Black Panthers, a political party that sought to improve the lives of Mizrahi Jews
(Jews who were immigrated from the Middle East).80
Much like its ancestors, Hadash is composed as a Jewish-Arab party that caters to
both communities. The party’s priorities best reflect this. Although Hadash does support
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Israeli Arab rights, it also supports women’s and workers’ rights, disarmament,
environmental policies, and an end to privatization. Hadash’s mission statement is to
unite both Jewish and Arab supporters for peace, equality, and democracy and to a
political alternative to governmental policies it viewed as wrong. 81 Despite this interethnic composition, Hadash attracts mostly Israeli Arab voters because the party focuses
more on a Palestinian nationalistic identity than a communist identity or a Jewish/Arab
identity in its campaign materials.82
Hadash flourished after its creation in the late 1970s. Its platform at that time
reflected the changing social environment in Israeli Arab community and met the
demands of this community. In this time period, secularism was increasing amongst the
Israeli Arabs, and because of this, Hadash’s secular tenets attracted those secular within
the community. The party also at this time was the first to make such demands as the
demand for a two state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which attracted the
more general Israeli Arab community.
Hadash’s popularity began to decline in the mid 1980s, in part because of a larger
decline of communism’s popularity in Israel as the global Communist bloc became
weaker. The once revolutionary tenets of Hadash’s platform began to become the norm as
more Israeli Arab political parties entered the political stage and challenged it with
similar platform demands. The party was unable to adapt to the changing political

81

Hadash-Democratic Front for Peace and Equality <www.hadash.org.il/english>
Hillel Frisch. “Stability Admist Flux: The Arab Parties Come of Age in the 2006 General Elections.”
Israel Affairs 13 no. 2 (2007): 375-376. David Koren. “Arab Israeli Citizens in the 2009 Elections:
Between Israeli Citizenship and Palestinian Arab Identity.” Israel Affairs 16 no. 1 (2010): 133.
82

39

environment and even deterred voters with its harsh campaign tactics against these
rivals.83
However, Hadash still remains a dominant political party in the Israeli Arab
political spectrum. In most elections, the party has won either the largest or second
largest amount of Knesset seats amongst the Israeli Arab political parties competing,
Since the 1980s, the party has evolved and has begun to more heavily promote secular
issues that would conflict with all the religious communities within the state. In 2003, the
party released a new mission statement that for the first time stated it supports a secular
state and a separation between religion and the state. The party began to support civil
marriages and divorces, civil institutions that only exist in Turkey in the Middle East.
Along with this mission statement, the party aired television campaign commercials that
featured Israeli Arab men drinking alcohol and Israeli Arab men and women
intermingling, features that offended religious Israeli Arabs for the features went against
Islamic principles.84 According to Islam, alcohol is forbidden and the sexes should not
intermingle in public places. Along with a secular identity, Hadash has begun to promote
specifically a Palestinian nationalist identity in its campaign materials. In the 2006
election, the party highlighted strongly in the city of Um al-Fahm that the candidate on its
list’s fourth slot is a citizen of the city. Leaflets contained a quote that stated that Hadash
represents pan-Arab nationalism and preserves Islamic and Arab civilization.85 With
these campaign materials, the political party appears to have abandoned its idea of
Jewish-Arab solidarity in favor of an idea that champions Palestinian nationalism. No
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longer is each community treated the same. Instead, Hadash caters to the Israeli Arab
community.
3.3.2: Arab Democratic Party(ADP)
The Arab Democratic Party (ADP) was founded by former Labour politician
Abdulwahab Darawshe as the First Intifada was occurring in Israel. At a rally protesting
the government’s reaction to the unrest in the occupied territories in January 1988, the
Knesset member announced that he was resigning from Labour and establishing a new
political party. Darawshe’s resignation was a reaction to an increase in governmental
discrimination against Israeli Arabs folliwng the First Intifada. This party, the ADP, was
founded in June later that year.
The political party operated on the idea that for there to be peaceful coexistence
amongst the Jews and Israeli Arabs, the Israeli Arabs must receive civic equality. At the
time of the party’s creation, civic equality for the community had not been achieved. The
party believed that the best way to achieve this civic equality was for a party representing
the Israeli Arabs to be part of the government’s government coalition. As a coalition
member, Israeli Arabs can obtain considerable political influence and benefits that will
allow the community to gain civic equality. Working within the Zionist parties to achieve
this equality was impossible. To the members of the ADP, the Zionist political parties
were not making any serious attempt to aid the Israeli Arabs and were just exploiting the
Israeli Arab vote for their gain. Civic equality must be achieved by an Israeli Arab
political party, although cooperation with the Jewish people and operating within the
Zionist political structure was necessary to achieve this.
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Civic equality was one of the main demands of the Arab Democratic Party. Other
demands were for the two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be enacted,
recognition of the Israeli Arabs as a national minority in Israel, and the full integration of
the Israeli Arabs in Israeli society. In terms of identity, the party believed that the Israeli
Arabs were a part of the Palestinian people, but any sort of autonomy for the community
was counterproductive for the party’s goal of civic equality. The party preferred full
integration into Israeli society while preserving an Israeli Arab identity. A Palestinian
nationalist identity was second to an Israeli identity that was considered equal by the
government for all ethnic groups in Israel.
ADP was able to gain one Knesset seat in its first election in 1988. Its success was
in part because the party focused more on the concerns of daily life for the Israeli Arab
community instead of the Palestinian cause. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was handled
more as lip service for the party. Success was also achieved due to how the party did not
offend the current political order by ignoring Zionism in its campaign material. In the
1996 election, ADP gained more seats as the United Arab List joined the party, and in the
1999 election, the party obtained more Knesset seats as a former prominent Hadash
member Hashem Mahameed joined the party. Despite these successes, by the 2003
elections, the Arab Democratic Party was absorbed into the United Arab List.86
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3.3.3: The National Democratic Assembly (Balad)
The National Democratic Assembly Party is a nationalist political party founded
in 1996 by Dr. Azmi Bishara, a philosophy professor from Bir Zeit University.87
Ironically, the National Democratic Assembly Party is known more commonly by its
Hebrew acronym, Balad. The reason the nationalist party uses a Hebrew acronym is that
the word exists in the Arabic language. In Arabic, Balad means “homeland” or “country”
in a more emotional sense of the word. By using the term Balad, the party illustrates that
its conception of nationalism is more philosophically-based than territorially-based.
Dr. Azimi Bishara is a unique figure in Israeli politics, in that he is the only
strong, charismatic political leader amongst the Israeli Arab political parties. Other Israeli
Arab parties lack such a leader in their organizations.88 To Bishara, Israeli Arabs are
essentially foreigners in Israel because of state actions towards them and because of the
Jewish composition of the state. The Israeli Arab community is an extension of the
Palestinian community outside Israel. Palestinians and Israeli Arabs are one and the
same. He believes that the best way for Israeli Arabs to live in the state is with civic
equality and cultural autonomy, although Israel must be a state designed for all its
citizens instead of a Jewish state for such living conditions to exist successfully.
However, instead of promoting a cultural autonomy, the Israeli government is pushing
the Israeli Arabs to the fringes of society and psychologically and culturally causing them
to view believe that they are semi-citizens in a policy Bishara names “Israelization”. To
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Bishara, this concept is best represented by Israeli Arabs who attempt to improve the
living standards of the community politically within the current governmental parameters
of Zionism and Israel as a Jewish state. Due to “Israelization”, the Israeli Arab
community is losing its Palestinian identity. Instead, the community is regarded as
citizens in a Jewish state.
The political party Balad is Bishara’s defense against Israelization.89 The party
campaigns for the Israeli Arab community to be recognized as a national minority in
Israel while also maintaining Bishara’s desired cultural autonomy. Under this autonomy,
the party wants a separate elected assembly and executive branch to rule over the Israeli
Arabs. As a national minority, the community would be officially protected from
institutional and private discrimination that excludes Israeli Arabs from higher education
and the job market. In terms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the party calls for the
Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories as well as for Israel to grant Palestinian
refugees the right of return and create a separate Palestinian state.90
In the beginning of the party’s life, Balad did not enter the Israeli election alone.
In the 1996 election, the party ran with Hadash while in the 1999 election, the party
joined with the Arab Movement for Change Party. During the 1999 election, Bishara
controversially ran for prime minister in the separate election for prime minister present
in Israel at that time and obtained two to three percent of the vote.91 He conceded defeat
before the second round of voting but has stated that winning was not his goal. His
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campaign was an attempt to publicize the grievances of the Israeli Arab population, even
though most Israeli Arabs and all Israeli Arab political parties criticized and condemned
his run for prime minister.92
In the 2003 election, Balad successfully ran independently winning the second
most Knesset seats amongst the Israeli Arab political parties. This success was in part
because of controversy Balad encountered before the election. Between the 1999 election
and the 2003 election, Bishara made statements after the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from Lebanon in 2000 that offended the mainstream Israeli community. He praised the
withdrawal as a victory for the Arab resistance and a sign of hope for total victory in the
future. He further courted controversy when he praised the terrorist group Hezbollah in
2001 as the Second Intifada raged and also encouraged Arabs to engage in a resistance
against Israel during a visit to the grave of Hafez al-Assad, the former dictator of Syria,
the same year. Bishara was attempting to advocate a pan-Arab and Palestinian nationalist
identity with these actions by portraying the Israeli state as an Other to the Israeli Arabs
and the Arabs outside Israel, but his actions had drastic consequences.

As a result of

these statements, the Knesset conducted a trial to remove Bishara’s immunity on the
grounds that he had broken the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance by praising
Hezbollah, encouraging Israel Arabs and Palestinians to adopt Hezbollah’s techniques,
and illegally arranging visits for Israeli Arabs to Syria. After deliberations, the Knesset
voted to remove Bishara’s immunity on November 7, 2001, the first such action from the
Knesset in the modern state’s history.
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Two months before the election, Israeli right-wing political parties brought the
case of both Balad and the United Arab List as well as individuals Bishara and Arab
Knesset members Ahmad Tibi and Abdul Malik Dechamshe to the Central Elections
Committee. Much like with the First Intifada, the Second Intifada, which was occurring
at the time of the 2003 election, increased the Israeli Jewish community’s fear of the
Israeli Arabs and diminished any tolerance towards the Israeli Arabs.93 Along with this
new opinion shift, the Israeli Left was diminishing and the Israeli Right was gaining more
power.94 The Israeli right-wing political parties claimed that these parties and members
violated Israeli electoral law by not accepting the Jewish democratic charter of the state.
The Central Elections Committee banned only Balad, Bishara, and Tibi from the election.
However, three weeks before the election was to commence, Israel’s High Court
overruled this decision. 95 In 2007, the government continued its persecution of Bishara
to the point that he left the country to avoid prosecution. Bishara currently lives in Qatar
where he is the founder and general director of the Arab Center for Research and Policy
Studies.96
Despite these obstacles, Balad has maintained a focus in its campaign materials
that exemplifies a Palestinian nationalist identity over an Israeli identity. The party’s
website is currently only in Arabic, and the party’s message remains to be about pride in
Palestinian culture and citizenship and criticism of Zionist organizations and practices. Its
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slogans in the 2009 election were “I’m an Arab-Palestinian. Full national identity.” and
“Your vote is a weapon of self defense.” 97
3.3.4: United Arab List (UAL)
The Islamic political organizations that formed the basis for the United Arab List
did not appear in the Israeli political scene until after the 1967 war. The Naqba created a
vacuum, and the military government prevented any such organization to operate while
the regime was enforced. While the military regime stunted any religious political
organizations from forming amongst the Israeli Arabs, religious seminaries and
fundamentalist religious organizations flourished in the West Bank and Gaza. With the
addition of these territories after the 1967 war, Israeli Arabs began to interact with the
religious organizations that were already founded in the occupied territories. This
interaction along with the end to the military government fostered similar religious
organizations to form within Israeli borders.
The most notable Islamic political organization is the Islamic Movement which
began to participate in municipal Israeli elections in 1984 and since its inception in the
mid 1980s, provided social services such as libraries and dental centers.98 Despite the
municipal participation, the Islamic Movement was divided concerning participation in
the national parliamentary elections. Proponents against participation did not recognize
the Knesset or the Israeli government at large and believed that the Knesset is against the
“spirit of Islam”, thus unable to further their Islamic objectives. Proponents for
participation viewed the national parliamentary elections as a legitimate and effective
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method for further the movement’s goals. Three weeks before the 1996 elections, the
Islamic Movement split with the southern branch of the Islamic Movement creating the
United Arab List political party and ran in conjunction with the Arab Democratic Party.99
Due to its origins from the Islamic Movement, the UAL’s main doctrines and
objectives are based in Islam. The party’s slogan is “Islam is the solution”, and the party
members’ main identity is as a Muslim with a Palestinian, Arab, and Israeli identity
secondary to this religious identity. By focusing on a religious identity, the UAL excludes
in its conception of Israeli Arabs the prominent Christian community within the Israeli
Arab community as well as other religious minorities in the community. The party
protests the Israeli authorities’ care of Muslim holy sites and demand that these holy sites
should be placed under Muslim care. According to the party, the Israeli Arabs are a
minority in the state that has experienced discrimination from the Israeli government
because of their culture and religion. Despite its religious ideology, the political party
campaigns for equal rights for all citizens of Israel and for the state to be a state for all
citizens instead of a Jewish state. It views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a pan-Islamic
issue but recognizes the state of Israel’s right to exist. To solve the conflict, the UAL
suggests that the best solution is a two state solution with a Palestinian state created from
the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian refugees having the right of return.100
In the 1999 election, the UAL won its highest amount of Knesset seats in
existence, winning the most Knesset seats amongst the Israeli Arab political parties. The
party’s success in the election was in debt to heightened tensions between Israeli Arab
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Christians and Muslims in the city of Nazareth, a political center for Israeli Arab political
life and predominantly Christian city. In 1997, a building was destroyed leaving new
property available in Nazareth located near the grave of Sheikh Shihab al-Din, the
nephew of Salah al-Din and near the Basilica of the Annunciation. The city council
agreed to use the new land to extend the Basilica in preparation for millennium
celebrations in 2000, but Muslim citizens protested the decision stating that the grave and
land were Islamic endowment property and a mosque instead should be built on the land.
The dispute intensified after the UAL won the majority of seats in the 1998 municipal
elections. During the 1998 Christmas procession and 1999 Easter celebrations, violence
erupted between Christian and Muslim youths. The dispute remained as the 1999
elections approached, and the UAL used the issue as part of its campaign, resulting in an
electoral victory.101 However, in the following election, the UAL increased its religious
rhetoric to disappointing results. The party failed to win more Knesset seats than Balad or
Hadash in the 2003 election and has failed to achieve results similar to the 1999 election
since then.102 It can be assumed then that the Israeli Arab community has been unable to
accept the Islamic identity as the community’s main identity in the same degree as in the
1999 elections.
3.4: Important Factors Concerning the Israeli Arab Political Parties
No matter how many Knesset seats an Israeli Arab political party wins, the
likelihood of an Israeli Arab political party joining the governing coalition is slim. Due to
Israel’s fractured party system, a governing coalition is necessary for any political party
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to govern Israel. One party is unable to obtain the necessary parliamentary seats to
unilaterally control the Knesset. If the politician designated by the president to form a
coalition, he or she must choose wisely which political parties are a part of the governing
coalition. If one party within the coalition has a platform deemed too controversial, the
coalition is susceptible to collapse whether before or during the coalition’s rule. Enough
political parties could refuse to join a coalition with such a controversial party that a
coalition could never be initially formed to govern the state. If a coalition is still able to
be formed with a controversial party, discontent with that party’s platform and actions
would grow to the point of a major coalition member’s defection and the coalition’s
demise. In Israeli politics, the demand for a withdrawal from the occupied territories and
a two state solution are considered too controversial for most politically mainstream
Israel citizens and political parties. Parties, particularly those on the political Left, may
say they support one of these issue or the other but while in power, rarely enforce these
issues in practice. Doing so would anger the constituents and end their rule in the
Knesset. On the other hand, the Israeli Arab political parties actively promote a
withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state because their constituents support
the issues. Any governing coalition with an Israeli Arab political party would therefore be
certain to collapse before a term is complete. In order to prevent a failed government, a
politician must then not consider an Israeli Arab political party as a possible member for
a governing coalition.103
The inability to enter a governing coalition has resulted in the Israeli Arab
political parties to act much like Slovakia’s SMK party when it was no longer in a
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governing coalition by beginning to radicalize their campaign messages by the definition
of radicalization formed by Bochler and Szocsik in their study of the Hungarian political
parties in Slovakia. According to Bochler and Szocsik, radicalization is when an ethnic
party promotes more ethnically based demands that stray from the political mainstream,
but the radicalization in Israel is an adoption of a more ethnically based identity that
strays from the political mainstream.104 The phenomenon has been evidenced in more
recent elections dating from 2003 onwards which can partially be attributed to the shift in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the nationwide political shift in recent years. After the
Oslo Accords and the formation of the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli public began to
believe it was beginning a post-Zionist age, and the Israeli Arabs began to believe they
may play a more important role in Israeli politics. They began to be dissatisfied with the
current Israeli politics when their prediction failed to occur. In the 1999 election, the
Israeli Arab public believed that they would have the decisive role in the election for
prime minister and therefore be included in a governing coalition. However, because the
winner Ehud Barak won due to a large Jewish electorate, he did not include an Israeli
Arab political party in the coalition. The omission left the Israeli Arab electorate feeling
bitter.105
In the 2006 elections, the political party Kadima gained control of the Knesset,
marking the first time a party other than the dominant Labour and Likud ruled the
Knesset. Kadima’s win indicated a new political shift in Israel from a loose two party
system to a weak central party system. In the former system that had existed since Labour
lost the 1977 elections, Israeli Arab political parties were treated as balancers between the
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two parties and were able to gain resources even though the parties were never accepted
into a governing coalition. The new political system demands a greater emphasis on
attracting potential coalition partners, so Israeli Arab political parties are unable to
receive such resources.106
This radicalization has appeared as a focus on a Palestinian nationalist identity
instead of an Israeli identity. It can be illustrated by practices such as in the 2009 election
with Balad only using Arabic in its campaign materials and highlighting Arab culture and
Palestinian citizenship in them and UAL presenting an Islamic identity and Palestinian
victimization by the Israeli government in its campaign materials.107 By adopting a more
radicalized message, the political parties provide a way for the Israeli Arab electorate to
express their dissatisfaction with the current Israeli political system and Israeli society in
general by differentiating themselves from the mainstream Jewish population while
ensuring that there will be support for Israeli Arab issues in the Knesset.108 These
political parties’ radicalized messages present the parties as bastions for the Israeli Arab
ethnicity and present support for these parties as less of a political reason and more as an
ethnic reason. To vote for an individual Israeli Arab political party now is to vote for the
Israeli Arab community specifically and for how that party perceives the ethnic group.
A noteable form of low grade radicalization amongst the Israeli Arab electorate is
to not vote in the elections.109 As Table A from Konan’s election analysis of the 2009
election below reveals, the percentage of Israeli Arabs voting has been declining over a
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period of time as well. A decline in voting participation is occurring amongst the overall
Israeli population as the voting population experiences voting fatigue from the five early
parliamentary elections that have occurred in about a decade and the subsequent low
opinion of Israeli politicians. For Israeli Arabs, this low opinion is a result of the
marginal status of Israeli Arabs in the Knesset and the inability of the Israeli Arab
political parties to unite and produce efficient results.110 The response is to not vote
which can be perceived as a low grade form of radicalization amongst the Israeli Arab
electorate.

Israeli Arab Voter Participation
Year
1949
1951
1955
1959
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
1981
1984
1988
1992
1996
1999
2001
2003
2006

Voting Percentage
79
86
90
85
83
82
80
73
74
68
72
74
70
77
75
18
62
56.3

* From Koren’s“Arab Israeli Citizens in the 2009 Elections:
Between Israeli Citizenship and Palestinian Arab Identity.” pg. 130.

The decline in voting participation can also be attributed to mass boycotting of the
elections that some Israeli Arab voters practice. To those who do boycott, the elections
110
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and the Knesset overall are the components of the Israeli Zionist agenda and will only
hurt Palestinians. To some, boycotting is the Israeli Arab public’s way of protesting
government actions against the Israeli Arab community and the Palestinian community at
large. During the 2009 election, those in favor of a boycott used the 2008 Israeli attack on
Gaza as a rallying point. The threat of boycotting is so strong that the Israeli Arab parties
campaign for not only votes for their individual parties but the Israeli Arab community
voting in general. In 2009, all three major Arab parties published a joint manifesto calling
for Israeli Arabs to vote as a way to preserve Israeli Arab civil rights and protest actions
such as the Gaza attack.111
Another important factor to remember is Israel’s demographics during these
elections. As of 2009, the time of the last researched election, the total Israeli population
was 7,485,600 according to the state census. Of this 7,485,600 people, 1,517,800 of these
people were Israeli Arabs who constituted 20.28% of the population, and 5,655,400 of
these people were Jews who constituted 75.55% of the population. As Graph A below
reveals, these figures are part of a gradual demographic shift occurring in Israel. The
graph is a comparison of the percentage of Jews and Israeli Arabs in the population in
each election year. As time has progressed, the percentage of Israeli Arabs in the
population has increased over time to about a fifth of the population by 2009. Along with
this rise, the percentage of Jews in the population has decreased. This change in
demographics influences the size of the electorate that could possibly vote for an Israeli
Arab political party.
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Graph A: A Comparison of the Percentage of Jews and Israeli Arabs in the Population at
Each Election Year
Within the Israeli Arab community, the ethnic group is divided by religion. A
member of the ethnic group is generally a Muslim, a Christian, or a Durze. At the time of
the last researched election, the Muslim population was recorded by the Israeli census as
1,270,300 or 16.97% of the population. The Christian population was 151,000 or 2.02%
of the total population, and the Druze population was 124,000 or 1.66% of the
population. According to Graph B below, the Christian and Druze populations have
remained steady since the establishment of the state of Israel, but the Muslim population
has grown exponentially. Therefore, within the Israeli Arab electorate, the Muslim
population is the most prominent of the religious communities.
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Graph B: A Comparison of the Percentage of Religious Groups in the Population at Each
Election Year
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Chapter 4: Analysis
4.1: The Data and Method
To determine the success of the Israeli Arab political parties, I will compare the
percentage of Knesset seats of each Israeli Arab political party and the parties overall and
compare these percentages to the percentage of the Israeli Arab population in the Israeli
population in the year of each election. Overall success is if the percentage of Israeli Arab
political parties Knesset seats is near the percentage of the Israeli Arab population.
Individual success is determined by how many Knesset seats each party wins. The
percentage of seats had been calculated from election data provided by the Israeli
government on the Knesset official website. I took note of the total Knesset seats won by
all the Israeli Arab political parties for each election year from the first election in 1949
to the eighteenth election in 2009 and calculated a percentage of how many seats each
party won from the 120 seats available. I did not incorporate the most recent election
from 2012 in my data set, for the Israeli government has not published census data for
this year.
The percentage of Israeli Arabs in the population was determined by information
provided by the Israeli Census Bureau. The census states the yearly average population. It
is important to note that since the beginning of the census in 1949 until 1995, the Israeli
census only differentiated the Israeli population as Jews or Arabs. Any member of an
ethnic group that was not Jewish was designated as Arab until 1995 when the census
added an “Other” section for those who did not identity as Arab or Jewish such as nonEthiopian African immigrants or Filipino immigrants. While this means that the
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percentage of Israeli Arabs could be slightly inflated, it also illustrates the view of
ethnicity in Israel. Israel is an ethnic state designed for ethnic Jews, so the Jewish identity
is the primary identity of the state. This explains why the census only provides one
section for anyone considered a Jew even though the ethnic group is not homogenous.
Amongst the Jewish ethnicity, there are subdivisions based on where each person
originates. Ashkenazi Jews are from Europe with Jews from Russia forming their own
subgroup. Mizrahi Jews are from predominately the Middle East and North Africa while
Jews from Ethiopia are their own subgroup. Despite differences in origin, culture, and
treatment by the Israeli government, these people are all the same in the eyes of the
Israeli government because they are Jewish. However, the Israeli government perceives
anyone inherently different from the Jewish population as an Arab, making Israeli Arabs
the nation’s Other.
Israeli Arabs are not limited to the Israeli Arab political parties but have also been
Knesset representatives for Zionist political parties. To compare this phenomenon to the
results of the Israeli Arab political parties, I calculated the percentage of the Knesset seats
held by Israeli Arabs overall by election year. Data for this calculation came from the
historical list of Knesset members provided by the Israeli government on the Knesset
website. I calculated how many names on the list for each Knesset formation were Arabic
in origin and therefore held by an Israeli Arab Knesset member. While this process may
have created a false positive if a person with such a name was actually Jewish or another
ethnicity from Israeli Arab, I believe the likelihood for a false positive is low and will not
inflate my results significantly.
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4.2: Israeli Arab Political Parties Overall in Terms of Percentage of Seats
The first two graphs in my analysis represents a comparison of the performance of
all the Israeli Arab political parties in terms of the percentage of seats the parties hold in
each Knesset and the percentage of the Israeli Arab community in Israel. Graph C has the
percentage of the Israeli Arab population calculated from the Israeli Census’s average
population statistics whereas Along with a comparison between the population and the
percentage of seats held by the Israeli Arab political parties, I have included in the graphs
the percentage of seats held by all Israeli Arab Knesset members in order to compare this
with the percentage of Israeli Arabs in the population.
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Graph C: The Percentage of the Israeli Arab Population Compared with the Percentage of
Seats Held by Israeli Arab Political Parties
As can be seen from the graph, the Israeli Arab political parties’ representation in
the Knesset is not equal to the Israeli Arabs’ representation in the population. The
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percentage of Knesset seats held by Israeli Arab political parties is significantly less than
the percentage of Israeli Arabs in the population with the largest difference being 16.47
in 1988 and the smallest difference being 11.11 in 2009. The difference in 1988 can be
attributed to a drop in Knesset seats resulting from the First Intifada which began the year
before in 1987. The exact correlation between the First Intifada and the plummet in the
percentage is unclear. The increase of Israeli Arab Knesset members between the 1984
and 1988 elections suggest that there was still political support for the Israeli Arabs even
though the percentage of Knesset seats for the parties decreased between the same years.
Israeli Arabs were still welcomed in the political process, just not in the guise that these
political parties represented. With a voter participation percentage of 72% at that election,
the possibility of a boycott being the reason is low as well. Israeli Arabs were voting but
were not voting for the Israeli Arab political parties.
The difference in 2009 is part of an increase in Knesset seats that began after the
nadir of 1988. The increase between the 1988 and 1999 elections could be attributed to a
combination of new Israeli Arab political parties such as Balad and the improvements in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that occurred during the 1990s. The existence of new
Israeli Arab political parties that represented different political ideas beyond those
espoused by Hadash diverted Israeli Arab votes from Zionist parties that this group
would normally support as an alternative to Hadash to these parties instead. The Madrid
Conference and the Oslo Accords reversed whatever created the decline in Knesset
representation for the Israeli Arab political parties that resulted due to the First Intifada.
The decline in the 2003 elections is related to the Second Intifada that began in
2000 and ended in 2005, but it is important to note that this decline is not as steep as the
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decline following the First Intifada. Instead of a plummet, the drop is more of a minor
fluctuation that naturally occurs in political systems. Whereas the percentage of Knesset
seats was 1.67% in the 1988 election, the percentage was 6.67%. A large percentage of
Israeli Arabs remained with the Israeli Arab political parties instead of boycotting or
voting for Zionist parties. One such reason that the Israeli Arab political parties
maintained support could be the Jewish population’s radicalization against the Israeli
Arab population as represented by actions such as the trial against Azmi Bishara and the
temporary ban on Balad and UAL. This population’s radicalization could have deterred
the Israeli Arabs from voting for Zionist parties instead of Israeli Arab political parties.
Another possible reason could be that the Israeli Arab parties started to radicalize their
message in the 2003 elections and that this radicalization reflected the radicalization
occurring within the Israeli Arab community. The radicalization encouraged the Israeli
Arab population to still vote despite the political atmosphere caused by the Second
Intifada and vote for the Israeli Arab political votes instead of the Zionist parties. It is too
early to see the full effect of the parties’ radicalization.
4.2.1: Hadash
For each individual Israeli Arab political party that I researched, I have composed
a graph to illustrate the individual performance of these parties by the number of Knesset
seats each party wins in an election. Graph D represents the performance of Hadash.
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Graph D: Hadash’s Performance by Knesset Seats
Unlike the other Israeli Arab political parties, the number of Hadash’s Knesset
seats has fluctuated considerably due to the party’s longevity. The first decline between
the 1977 and 1981 elections is connected to Hadash’s decline in the 1980s as the party
was unable to adapt to the changing political environment, but the plummet to zero
Knesset seats can be attributed to the First Intifada. Hadash’s inability to gain any
parliamentary seats in that election explains why the Israeli Arab political parties’
percentage of Knesset seats is so low in the 1988 elections. At the time of that election,
Hadash was the only major Israeli Arab political party in existence; others may have
existed but paled in comparison to Hadash. If Hadash did poorly in an election, the Israeli
Arab political parties did poorly in an election.
I could not find any evidence that Hadash boycotted the 1988 elections, but there
is a possibility that Hadash party leaders recognized that the political environment
surrounding the First Intifada was not conductive for party success and did not strongly
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campaign in the election. If the First Intifada did not encourage a boycott of some kind,
then it was a shock that was so strong to the party constituents that they momentarily
abandoned the political party. Hadash is a party that promotes Jewish-Arab solidarity, the
antithesis of the First Intifada. Either way, it is telling that Hadash was able to easily
rebound from such a defeat to a peak of five seats during the era of the Oslo Accords.
Whatever the cause for the 1988 election results, it was temporary, and Hadash was able
to adapt to the point that its election results remained steady during the Second Intifada.
4.2.2: Balad
The performance of the political party Balad is portrayed below in Graph E.
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Graph E: Balad’s Performace by Knesset Seats
Although Balad was formed in 1996, the political party is not mentioned in the
official election results for 1996 because the party was running with Hadash. With its
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breakaway from Hadash following the 1996 elections, Balad officially appears in the
election results with two Knesset seats in the 1999 elections. The rise to three Knesset
seats between the 1999 and 2003 elections is consistent with the rise in the party’s
popularity following the Israeli government’s trials against Bishara and the Israeli
Electoral Commission’s temporary ban of the party. However, the interest in the party
has been maintained long after the persecution of Balad with the party obtaining three
Knesset seats in the two following elections.
4.2.3: Arab Democratic Party and United Arab List
In Graph F, the performances of both the Arab Democratic Party and the United
Arab List are displayed. I have combined the trend lines for the Arab Democratic Party
and the United Arab List because by the 2003 elections, the UAL absorbed the Arab
Democratic Party and ran with the party in the 1996 and 1999 elections.

6
5
4
3

United Arab List
Arab Democratic Party

2
1

2009

2006

2003

1999

1996

1992

1988

1984

1981

1977

1973

1969

1965

1961

1959

1955

1951

1949

0

Graph F: Arab Democratic Party and United Arab List’s Performances by Knesset Seats
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The graph illustrates that during the 1990s when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
was improving, the Arab Democratic Party’s number of Knesset seats was rising to a
peak of five Knesset seats in the 1999 elections when the party ran with UAL. Before the
1999 elections, the Christian and Muslim communities were experiencing tensions due to
the land dispute in Nazareth. Following the 1999 elections, the Arab Democratic Party is
absorbed by UAL and no longer runs as an individual party.
Once the two party run as UAL, there is a drop to two Knesset seats. It was at this
time that the party increased its religious rhetoric with the Second Intifada occurring
during this election as well. The party maintained its religious rhetoric following the 2003
election, yet it has achieved equilibrium at four Knesset seats. Therefore, the political
environment following the 2003 elections and the Second Intifada was more conductive
to UAL’s message.
4.2.4: A Comparison of Israeli Arab Political Parties by Seats
For someone to better observe how each party’s electoral performance relates to
the other political parties, I have combined the parties’ performances in Graphs D to F
into one graph. This combination is displayed by Graph G below.
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Graph G: A Comparison of All Israeli Arab Political Parties’ Performances
The comparison of the Israeli Arab political parties’ seats altogether reveals that
each party’s performance is dependent on the other parties as well as outside influences.
In the 1988 elections, Hadash has zero Knesset seats, but Arab Democratic Party has
entered the political system at this time as well. When Hadash decreases from its peak to
three Knesset seats in the 1999 elections, Balad entered the political race, and UAL and
Arab Democratic Party reached its peak of five Knesset seats. Hadash remains at this
level as the other parties fluctuate. When UAL loses seats in the 2003 election, Balad
gains a parliamentary seat. The political parties are not working in tandem but instead
competing against each other, and this competition affects how well the Israeli Arab
political parties perform in the elections.
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4.3:Labour: A Point of Comparison
The Israeli Arab political parties’ performance results could possibly not be
unique to these parties but actually representative of all Israeli political parties. In order
to best understand how the Israeli Arab political parties’ performances relate to general
Israeli politics, I have included in my analysis two graphs representing respectively the
percentage of Knesset seats held and the number of Knesset seats won by the major
political party Labour. I have chosen to compare the Israeli Arab parties to Labour
because for most of Israel’s history, Labour has been the dominant political party and
thus the quintessential Israeli political party. Labour also represents the political Left in
Israel which is where the Israeli Arab political parties reside on the Israeli political
spectrum. Therefore, Labour is the biggest Zionist competitor for the Israeli Arab
political parties. Even though the elements of Labour have existed since the
establishment of the state of Israel, I have started the graphs with the 1969 elections, for it
is only at this time that the party officially runs in the election under the name of Labour.
Below, Graph H represents the percentage of seats Labour has held in the Knesset, and
Graph I represents the number of seats Labour has won in each election.

67

50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1949 1951 1955 1959 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006 2009

*Between the 1969 and 1984 elections, ran with the Mapam Party. In the 1988 election, ran with
the Independent Liberal Party. In the 1999 election, ran with the parties Meimad and Gesher.

Graph H: The Percentage of Seats Held by Labour
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Graph I: Labour’s Performance by Seats
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As the graph representing Labour’s percentage of the Knesset seats reveals, not
even a dominant party can achieve a majority of parliamentary seats in Israel. The highest
percentage Labour has achieved is 46.67% in the 1969 election when the party
singlehandedly dominated the political system. Besides the peak of that election, the
party’s percentage has ranged from the low forties to the twenties to the tens. The Israeli
political system fluctuates so much that not even Labour can maintain equilibrium. The
Israeli Arab political parties’ variations between zero and five Knesset seats are therefore
as much evidence of Israel’s electoral chaos as any other causes and the ability to
maintain any stability is remarkable. The low numbers signifies that achieving any
significant percentage of seats is difficult for Israeli political parties, so a percentage that
is less than ten percent may be good results for a minor party like the Israeli Arab
political parties.
The graphs for Labour also hint at another phenomenon crucial to an
understanding of the Israeli Arab political parties. As time has progressed, Labour’s
dominance has decreased with the decrease becoming continuous after the 1992
elections, the time that several Israeli Arab political parties enter the political field and
gain more Knesset seats. The Israeli Arab political parties appear to perform better as
Labour’s hold on the Israeli political system loosens. This loosening breeds an
environment where parties like the Israeli Arab political parties and ethnic parties in
general can flourish.

69

Chapter 5: Conclusion
In order to better understand the Israeli Arab community in Israel, I have
researched the Israeli Arab political parties that exist in the nation today. In particular, I
have researched if the parties are successful in creating an accurate representation of the
community in the Israeli parliament as well as display any considerable influence in the
parliament or stability. I have also proposed the question of what triggered the creation of
these parties and how they interact with one another in elections. In relation to H1, I
concluded that the hypothesis is correct. The Israeli Arab political parties are not
successful in a general sense of the term. The parties have consistently failed to achieve a
percentage of Knesset seats that is similar to the percentage of the population that is
Israeli Arab. As of the last researched election, the parties’ percentage of Knesset seats is
about half of the population percentage. The parties are unsuccessful as well in terms of
power for the parties have been excluded in every governing coalition created.
However, as the graphs demonstrating the Labour Party’s performance in these
elections reveal, the Israeli political system creates difficulties for even a major party to
achieve a significant number of parliamentary seats. The system’s fractionalization that
results from a low electoral threshold has made it impossible for even Labour to achieve
a majority of the Knesset seats when the party had supreme dominance of the political
system. If Labour was unable to obtain a percentage of Knesset seats that reflected its
power, the smaller Israeli Arab political parties should be unable to obtain a percentage
of seats that reflects the population. The parameters of success that I had originally
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designed may be inaccurate for the Israeli system then. Since their creation, the parties
have been able to maintain stability in the elections, something that Labour has failed to
do. This stability could demonstrate a form of success for the parties’ dominance of their
constituents has been maintained for a long period of time and has ensured that the Israeli
Arabs are a permanent fixture in the Knesset. The number of politicians may not best
reflect the population, but their tenure could remind the Knesset of the Israeli Arab
community’s existence.
The detailed description of each political party shows that H2 is incorrect. The
parties are not a unified movement despite similar goals. Each party has a different
perception on what the Israeli Arab identity should be. Hadash believes the Israeli
identity is dominant Balad believes the community’s identity is separate from the Israeli
identity and is Palestinian identity, and UAL believes the dominant identity is an Islamic
identity. This truth is further realized by observing the graph depicting all the Israeli Arab
political parties’ performances together. Each party’s success occurs as another party fails
in an election. The parties are not working together; they are competing against each
other as well as against the Zionist parties.
As for the creation of the parties, it appears that H3 is correct. The Israeli Arab
political parties are conforming to Van Cott’s theory of ethnic political parties. Three of
the four political parties studied formed around the 1990s which coincides with the First
Intifada and the temporary electoral reforms. The First Intifada encouraged the Israeli
Arab community to become more politically engaged as a way to possibly prevent an
intifada from occurring within Israel’s borders and possibly as a way to protect the
community from the growing prejudice caused by the First Intifada. While this result is
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not exactly a creation of social movements, the atmosphere created by the First Intifada is
very similar. The electoral reforms following the First Intifada decentralized the political
system and created an environment that promoted fracturing, as evidenced by the recordbreaking number of political parties that won seats in the 1999 elections. Together, the
two events resulted in the phenomenon of multiple Israeli Arab political parties being
formed that were strong enough to enter the Knesset.
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